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Abstract 
While diagnostic negative feedback may be threatening, self-affirmation theory suggests 
that individuals may accept this feedback when reminded of core values because they are able to 
maintain feelings of worth. One potential mechanism of self-affirmation is high-level 
construal—thinking about events in terms of their core aspects. High-level construal reduces 
defensiveness when negative feedback is relevant, changeable, and diagnostic (Belding et al., In 
Press). We predict that if high-level construal drives self-affirmation, changeability and 
diagnosticity also moderate self-affirmation’s effectiveness. We used a 2 (self-affirmation: 
affirmed or control) x 2 (changeability: high or low) x 2 (diagnosticity: high or low) between 
subjects experiment to examine whether self-affirmation increases search for information on 
weaknesses (indicating receptiveness) over strengths (indicating defensiveness). Although the 
results failed to support our hypothesis, directions and implication for future research are 
discussed.  
Keywords: self-affirmation, construal level theory, information search, negative feedback 
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 Diagnostic negative feedback – information that highlights weaknesses and deficiencies – 
presents a motivational dilemma. On the one hand, such information is useful in that it identifies 
areas for growth and may facilitate efforts to improve over time (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; 
Sedikides & Hepper, 2009; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995; Trope & Neter, 1994). On the 
other hand, this information is emotionally painful. As a result, research suggests that when 
presented with negative feedback, people often respond defensively (e.g., by choosing to ignore 
it or decide that it is unimportant; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovich, & 
Lockhart, 1998; Higgins, 1987; Trope & Neter, 1994). For example, Liberman and Chaiken 
(1992) showed that when presented with information about the health risks of caffeine, coffee 
drinkers were defensive in that they were less likely to accept this information than non-coffee 
drinkers. Although coffee drinkers could pursue long-term self-improvement and gain more from 
awareness of the health risks of caffeine, they were more willing to defensively believe 
information suggesting that the link did not exist. Consequently, they were less likely to improve 
their health by reducing their consumption.  
Given the costs of ignoring diagnostic feedback, psychological research has sought to 
uncover what factors decrease this defensiveness and instead lead people to focus on long-term 
improvement or growth concerns (Sedikides & Hepper, 2009; Trope, 1986; Trope & Neter, 
1994). One strategy for increasing receptiveness to negative feedback is self-affirmation. Self-
affirmation theory contends that individuals want to maintain feelings of self-integrity, and are 
motivated to protect their self-integrity when presented with a threat (for a review, see Sherman 
& Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). Individuals are self-affirmed when they are reminded of their core 
values and characteristics, which allows them to maintain their feelings of self-worth even in the 
face of potential threats (e.g., Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 
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2000). For example, if a person who values athletics wrote an essay about why athletics is 
important to him/her, he/she would have engaged in the process of self-affirmation (McQueen & 
Klein, 2006).  
Among other things, self-affirmation effectively reduces individuals’ defensiveness to 
negative feedback (Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris & Napper, 
2005; Klein & Harris, 2009; Sherman et al., 2000). Health-risk information, one common type of 
negative feedback, is threatening because it reminds recipients of potential of negative outcomes. 
Accordingly, recent meta-analyses have examined self-affirmation’s effect in changing 
intentions and behavior following exposure to health-risk information (Epton, Harris, Kane, van 
Koningsbruggen, & Sheeran, 2014; Sweeney & Moyer, 2014). These meta-analyses found that 
self-affirmation had a small but significant effect on health message acceptance, intentions to 
change, and behavior across many different types of health messages. In one study, Sherman and 
colleagues (2000) examined self-affirmation’s effect on female coffee drinkers confronted with 
information suggesting a link between coffee consumption and fibrocystic disease. Because the 
coffee drinkers faced negative information about their habit, they may have felt threatened and 
refused to accept that they should change. Indeed, replicating past work (Liberman & Chaiken, 
1992), female coffee drinkers in the control condition responded defensively by choosing to 
ignore the threatening information provided. However, self-affirmation effectively attenuated 
this threat and made coffee drinkers more willing to acknowledge that they were participating in 
unhealthy behaviors (Sherman, et al, 2000).  
Potential Mechanisms of Self-Affirmation 
Although self-affirmation has been shown to reduce defensiveness, the mechanism by 
which it does so is unclear (e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Some preliminary research suggested 
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that self-affirmation increased one’s self-esteem (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & 
Dijksterhuis, 1999, Study 3). Additional empirical tests of this particular mechanism, however, 
have been mixed (e.g., Crocker, Niiya, & Mischowski, 2008; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Other 
research suggests that positive other-directed feelings may play a role. For example, Crocker and 
colleagues (2008) showed that affirmed participants reported greater feelings of love and 
connection, which appear to account for individuals’ reduced defensiveness to a message 
containing negative feedback.  
Construal Level Theory and Defensiveness 
In the present work, we focus on another potential mechanism by which self-affirmation 
may reduce defensiveness: namely, construal level. Construal Level Theory posits that 
individuals can represent (or construe) the world at varying levels of abstraction (see Trope & 
Liberman, 2010, for a review). Individuals tend to construe events at higher levels of abstraction 
as the events become more psychologically distant (i.e., removed in time, physical distance, 
social distance, or hypotheticality). As events become more removed from the observer’s here-
and-now, people typically engage in high-level construal because they are forced to think about 
events in terms of their core, central characteristics. When events are psychologically near, 
people may engage in low-level construal because they have information regarding specific 
details and idiosyncratic qualities. For example, if a person engaging in high-level construal 
thinks about completing a personality test, that person may think of this behavior as revealing 
information about what he/she is like. Conversely, when engaging in low-level construal, that 
person may think about this behavior as simply answering questions. 
Notably, high-level construal enhances consideration of long-term concerns over short-
term concerns when people have conflicting motives (e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-
Construal & Self-Affirmation 6 
Sagi, 2006).  That is, research suggests that people behave in line with their long-term goals (vs. 
short-term temptations) when engaged in high-level versus low-level construal (Fujita, 2008; 
Fujita & Carnevale, 2012). When people are exposed to negative feedback, short-term self-
protection motives compete with long-term self-change motives. Thus, high-level construal, by 
helping one weight their long-term goals over short-term temptations, should lead one to be more 
accepting of the information (e.g., Freitas, Salovey, & Liberman, 2001). Indeed, research 
supports this prediction. For example, Freitas and colleagues (2001) found that individuals 
prompted to engage in high-level (vs. low-level) construal were more receptive to negative 
feedback because they were more willing to learn about their weaknesses in “social intelligence.”  
Recent work by Belding, Naufel, and Fujita (In Press) extended previous research by 
examining high-level construal’s effect beyond information search and avoidance to information 
acceptance and rejection. Additionally, they examined moderators of high-level construal’s 
effect. They predicted that high-level construal should only reduce defensiveness to negative 
feedback to the extent that the information is changeable and relevant. To examine this 
hypothesis, they randomly assigned high and low relevance groups to engage in high or low-
level construal and to receive feedback about health behavior that was either malleable or fixed. 
When the information was presented as unchangeable, individuals in the relevant group engaging 
in both high and low-level construal were defensive to the negative feedback. However, 
individuals for whom the information was relevant were less defensive when the information 
was changeable when using high-level construal relative to low-level construal. One explanation 
for these results is that engaging in high-level construal helped the high relevance group to 
realize the long-term value in responding receptively to threatening but useful information. In 
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addition, the low relevance group may not have been motivated to change their behavior because 
the information did not concern them.  
Self-Affirmation and Construal Level 
Importantly, research suggests a link between self-affirmation and construal level 
(Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Sherman et al., 2013; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Specifically, self-
affirmation may promote a shift toward construing information in higher-level terms. For 
example, research demonstrates that self-affirmation promotes identifying behaviors in terms of 
their end states rather than their means (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Sherman et al., 2013; 
Wakslak & Trope, 2009), as measured with the Behavioral Identification Form (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1987). Furthermore, some evidence suggests that self-affirmation allows participants to 
assess their self-concept in a more coherent and structured way, and increases focus on goal-
relevant aspects of stimuli (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Together, these findings support the idea 
that self-affirmation promotes high-level construal, and that construal level may be the 
mechanism by which self-affirmation reduces defensiveness to negative feedback.  
Present Research 
The present research attempts to extend previous work linking construal level to self-
affirmation. Consistent with previous research, we predict that self-affirmation will reduce 
defensiveness to negative feedback. We further propose that self-affirmation helps people 
resolve their conflict between short-term self-protection and long-term self-change motives by 
inducing high-level construal. To the extent that some variables moderate the impact of construal 
levels on defensiveness and that construal levels are related to self-affirmation, we might expect 
those same variables to moderate the impact of self-affirmation on defensiveness. If construal 
level processes are involved, moderators of construal level’s effectiveness (i.e., changeability, 
Construal & Self-Affirmation 8 
diagnosticity) should also moderate the effects of self-affirmation. We expect that when 
information is changeable and diagnostic, high-level construal is effective in reducing 
defensiveness. Thus, changeability and diagnosticity should represent boundary conditions for 
self-affirmation, such that negative feedback should be changeable and diagnostic for self-
affirmation to reduce defensiveness. 
Some preliminary research began to examine the role of changeability in self-
affirmation’s effectiveness. Howell and Shepperd (2012, Study 3) examined the effect of self-
affirmation at different levels of changeability. They presented participants with the opportunity 
to seek information about their risk for a disease that was either treatable or untreatable. When 
the disease was untreatable, those in the control group responded more defensively than when 
the disease was treatable. In line with their predictions, self-affirmation reduced defensiveness, 
as evidenced by an increased likelihood to seek information regarding their risk in general, even 
when the disease was untreatable. Although this may suggest that changeability does not 
moderate the impact of self-affirmation, it constitutes only one study with a null finding. Given 
the difficulties of interpreting a single null result, it is important to test this somewhat surprising 
result using different methodology. 
Beyond changeability, when individuals engage in high-level construal, they should only 
seek negative feedback to the extent that it is diagnostic. Diagnostic information has high 
informational value that can help individuals reduce uncertainty and improve (Morrison & 
Cummings, 1992). If information is not diagnostic, high-level construal should be less likely to 
motivate individuals to make a change because the information does not provide an accurate way 
to improve, thereby resolving the dual motive conflict. As additional support for the idea that 
diagnosticity may play an important role in increasing receptiveness to negative information, 
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previous research demonstrated that individuals tend to prefer diagnostic information to non-
diagnostic information when they are motivated to attain a goal (Trope 1986; Trope & Bassok 
1983; Trope & Brickman, 1975). For example, in one study, participants preferred to use items 
high in diagnosticity to assess their ability when given the chance to select items from tests 
measuring “integrative orientation.”  
When faced with a dual-motive conflict between self-change and self-protection 
concerns, diagnostic feedback should provide useful information that individuals can use to 
improve. High-level construal should enhance sensitivity to the diagnosticity of negative 
feedback because it shifts individuals’ focus to their self-change goals. Examining these 
moderators together, high-level construal should help individuals weight their long-term self-
change motives over their short-term self-protection motives to the extent that negative feedback 
is relevant, changeable, and diagnostic.  
In order to examine whether high-level construal may be involved in self-affirmation, we 
manipulated self-affirmation, changeability, and diagnosticity in the present research. To the 
extent that construal level mediates the relationship between self-affirmation and reduced 
defensiveness, self-affirmation should help people weigh their self-change motives over their 
self-protection motives when the feedback is useful and change is possible. We expect that the 
self-affirmed group will seek out information about weaknesses when the information is 
presented as high in changeability and diagnosticity, and will avoid information about 
weaknesses when the information is either presented as low in changeability, diagnosticity, or 
both. In addition, we predict that the non-affirmed groups will avoid negative feedback 
regardless of how the information is presented.  
Method 
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Participants  
Two hundred and forty-two introductory psychology students (122 female, 102 male, 18 
unreported) at The Ohio State University were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (self-
affirmation: affirmed vs. control) X 2 (changeability: high vs. low) X 2 (diagnosticity: high vs. 
low) between participants experiment and received partial course credit for participating during 
the fall semester. Participants believed they would take a short survey and complete a personality 
test. The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 32 (M = 18.81, SD = 1.56). We excluded 5 
participants for failure to follow instructions (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).1  
Procedure  
Participants completed all materials on computers running MediaLab (Jarvis, 2006). 
After providing informed consent, participants read that they would be taking a test that 
measured four components of emotional intelligence. We then asked participants to indicate their 
level of agreement with statements that appeared to relate to emotional intelligence, such as “I 
feel comfortable around people” and “I sympathize with others’ feelings” (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). In the next section of the test, participants read vignettes about 
several situations people may encounter and reported their expectations for the target’s behavior. 
For example, participants read, “Andrew walks into class a few minutes late to discover that all 
the chairs in the classroom are full. How do you think Andrew will solve this problem?” 
Participants then reported whether Andrew likely decided to leave the class and go home, walked 
to the hallway to find a new chair, or asked a fellow student to move his backpack out of a chair 
                                                
1 Approximately halfway through the experiment, participants read, “If you are reading this 
question, please select answer ‘3’.” Participants who did not answer “3” were excluded from 
analyses for failure to follow instructions.  
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(See Appendix A). We designed each vignette to be ambiguous and each response to be 
plausible, so that participants did not know how well they scored. 
After participants completed the test, we randomly assigned them to either a self-
affirmation or control condition as a supposedly unrelated study (McQueen & Klein, 2006). All 
participants ranked a list of values (artistic skills, sense of humor, relations with friends and 
family, spontaneity/living life in the moment, musical ability/appreciation, physical 
attractiveness, athletics, creativity, business/managerial skills, academics, and romantic values) 
from most to least important. We instructed those in the affirmation condition to write an essay 
about why their highest ranked value was important to them, whereas those in the control 
condition wrote about why their lowest ranked value may be important to someone else (see 
Appendix B).  
Participants then read a description of the emotional intelligence test that contained the 
changeability and diagnosticity manipulations (see Appendix C). All participants first read that 
emotional intelligence plays a major role in everyday life before reading the changeability 
manipulation. Participants in the low changeability condition read that individuals are largely 
unable to alter their emotional intelligence. This information stated that “Much research has 
shown that despite learning and experience in dealing with others, people are largely unable to 
alter the patterns of interacting with others that they learned at a very early age: their abilities 
tend to be fixed over time.” Alternatively, those in the high changeability condition read that 
their emotional intelligence was malleable. This information stated that “Much research has 
shown that starting at a young age and continuing through time, people can change their pattern 
of dealing with a variety of emotional interactions through learning and experience.” 
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Next, participants read information that contained the diagnosticity manipulation. In the 
high diagnosticity condition, participants read that award-winning Stanford University 
researchers conducted the research on the emotional intelligence inventory they had completed. 
In the low diagnosticity condition, participants learned that the test was the result of preliminary 
hypotheses by researchers from a high school. By altering the supposed source of the 
information, we presented the inventory as either providing highly diagnostic or relatively less 
diagnostic information. If participants believe that the test came from accredited researchers, 
they should consider the information to be more accurate and diagnostic than those who believe 
that the test came from high school students.  
After receiving information about the changeability and diagnosticity of the test, 
participants then learned that they had earned high scores in some domains but poor scores in the 
others domains. We provided this information to allow participants the opportunity to seek 
feedback information. They learned that they had the option to receive information about their 
performance on the emotional intelligence test, but that they could only choose to read either the 
strengths or the weaknesses feedback due to time constraints. As the dependent variable, 
participants indicated their choice between the two types of feedback. Additionally, participants 
completed several measures that assessed how much they wanted information in general (how 
much participants wanted just the strengths, just the weaknesses, neither, or both; 1 = Not at all, 
7 = Very much). Participants were offered the opportunity to seek negative feedback as a 
measure of defensiveness, but we did not give them that information for ethical reasons. Instead, 
they were asked to complete several additional measures before they would receive the 
information.  
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Following the choice of feedback, participants completed several items designed as 
manipulation checks. As a manipulation check of changeability, participants reported how 
changeable they perceived the feedback to be by answering “How changeable do you think your 
emotional intelligence is? (1 = Not at all changeable, 7 = Very changeable)” As manipulation 
checks of diagnosticity, participants reported how credible they thought the emotional 
intelligence inventory was and how valid they expected the report to be. Specifically, 
participants answered the items “How credible do you think the Barchard Emotional Intelligence 
Inventory is? (1 = Not at all credible, 7 = Very credible)” and “How valid do you believe the 
report you will soon receive of your performance will be? (1 = Not at all valid, 7 = Very valid)” 
These items should assess diagnosticity because if participants see the potential feedback as 
more credible and valid, they should believe that it could provide them with useful information 
about their abilities. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
Self-Affirmation Manipulation Check 
In order to verify that participants correctly completed the self-affirmation manipulation, 
we examined participants’ values ranking and the short paragraphs they wrote. Consistent with 
the work by Crocker and colleagues (2008), the most popular highest ranked value was 
relationship with friends and family whereas the most popular lowest ranked value was artistic 
skills/abilities. We next coded whether those in the affirmation condition wrote about why their 
highest ranked value was important to them while those in the control condition wrote about why 
their lowest ranked value was important to someone else. The vast majority of participants 
followed instructions (affirmation = 99%, control = 84%).  Most participants in the control 
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condition who did not follow directions wrote about why their lowest ranked value was 
unimportant to them rather than why it was important to someone else.   
Changeability Manipulation Check 
After examining the affirmation manipulation, we examined our changeability and 
diagnosticity manipulation checks using a 2 (affirmation: affirmed vs. control) x 2 
(changeability: high vs. low) x 2 (diagnosticity: high vs. low) between subjects ANOVA. 
Confirming the effectiveness of our changeability manipulation, participants in the high 
changeability condition (M = 4.93, SD = 1.13) saw their emotional intelligence as more 
malleable than those in the low changeability condition (M = 4.39, SD = 1.39), F(1, 218) = 
10.47, p = .001, d = 0.44. No other effects were significant (all ps > .27). 
Diagnosticity Manipulation Check 
Next, as a diagnosticity manipulation check, we assessed the perceived credibility of the 
test using the same analysis as above. The means for the high diagnosticity condition (M = 4.55, 
SD = 1.15) and low diagnosticity condition (M = 4.48, SD = .98) were directionally consistent, 
but the diagnosticity manipulation did not significantly impact perceived credibility of the 
emotional intelligence test, F(1, 218) = 1.34, p = 0.32, d = 0.15. No other effects were significant 
(all ps > .13).2  
As a second diagnosticity manipulation check, we assessed the perceived validity of the 
report. Consistent with our predictions, participants in the high diagnosticity condition (M = 
4.52, SD = 1.27) saw the upcoming report as more valid than those in the low diagnosticity 
                                                
2 The interaction of affirmation and diagnosticity was the effect closest to significance, F(1, 222) = 2.30, p = 0.13, d 
= .20. The diagnosticity manipulation appeared to work for participants in the control condition, but not for those in 
the affirmation condition.  Specifically, participants in the control condition perceived the high diagnosticity 
message (M = 4.66, SD = 1.32) as more credible than those in the low diagnosticity condition (M = 4.25, SD = .98), 
F(1, 108) = 3.28, p = 0.07, d = .35.  Participants in the affirmation condition, however, did not perceive the high 
diagnosticity message (M = 4.60, SD = 1.29) as more credible than those in the low diagnosticity condition (M = 
4.66, SD = .95), F(1, 115) = 0.07, p = 0.79, d = .06.  
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condition (M = 4.37, SD = 1.28), F(1, 218) = 3.94, p = .05, d = .27. Unexpectedly, participants in 
the self-affirmation condition (M = 4.65, SD = 1.16) also saw the potential report as more valid 
than those in the control condition (M = 4.37, SD = 1.37), F(1, 218) = 3.76, p = .05, d = .26. One 
potential explanation for this effect is that control participants responded defensively by 
downplaying the validity of the report but self-affirmation attenuated this defensiveness. No 
other effects were significant (all ps > .30). 
Choice of Feedback Information 
Confident that we had adequately checked our manipulations, we then examined 
participants’ choice between feedback on their weaknesses or strengths. Overall, 41% of the 
sample chose to receive information on their weaknesses. In order to examine whether self-
affirmation increased receptiveness to negative feedback when information was changeable and 
diagnostic, we regressed preferences for weaknesses over strengths on our three effects coded 
independent variables and their interactions using logistic regression. Neither the 3-way 
interaction of affirmation, changeability, and diagnosticity, B = .13, Z(235) = .98, p = .33 (see 
Figure 1), nor any of the lower order effects, were significant (all ps > .12; see Figure 1).3  
Additionally, we examined the continuous measures of information search. These 
measures assessed how much participants wanted information on just their strengths, just their 
weaknesses, neither type of information, and both. Contrary to our hypotheses, the three-way 
interaction of self-affirmation, changeability, and diagnosticity did not significantly influence 
preferences for information on strengths, F(1, 227) = 1.25, p = .27, d = .14, weaknesses, F(1, 
                                                
3 The interaction of changeability and diagnosticity was the effect closest to significance, B = -.20, Z(235) = -1.51, p 
= .13. When participants read the high changeability message, high diagnosticity promoted defensiveness 
(preferences for strengths over weaknesses) relative to low diagnosticity, B = -.39, Z(235) = -2.03, p = .04.  
However, this effect did not occur when participants read the low changeability message, B = .02, Z(235) = .09, p = 
.93. This trend may suggest that information was the least threatening when information was both changeable and 
non-diagnostic. All other effects were not significant, ps > .20. 
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227) = 0.64, p = 0.43, d = .11, neither type of information, F(1, 226) = .30, p = .59, d = .06, or 
both types of information, F(1, 226) = 0.68, p = .41, d = .11. No significant effects emerged on 
any of these measures (all ps > .08).4 
Discussion 
We predicted that self-affirmed participants would respond less defensively to negative 
feedback when the feedback was presented as highly changeable and diagnostic. While our 
changeability manipulation was effective, the diagnosticity manipulation impacted perceived 
validity but not credibility of the upcoming report. The data failed to support our predictions 
because the self-affirmed, high changeability, and high diagnosticity group did not display the 
expected reduced defensiveness (i.e., preference for weaknesses over strengths). However, 
certain aspects of the experiment, such as the effectiveness of the manipulations, the extent to 
which participants were driven by self-protection and self-change motives, and other potential 
mechanisms may have led to this failure to demonstrate reduced defensiveness. 
 A dual-motive conflict assumes that participants feel threatened by the negative feedback. 
One possible reason for our failure to demonstrate the predicted results may be due to the failure 
of the diagnosticity manipulation. Participants may not have trusted the information provided 
about the test, and information must be at least somewhat credible to affect either side of the 
dual-motive conflict. The means for both groups were near the midpoint of the scale, possibly 
suggesting that participants were not convinced that the feedback would be accurate enough to 
                                                
4 The interaction of changeability and diagnosticity on participants’ desire for strengths information was the effect 
closest to significance, F(1,178) = 3.02, p = 0.08, d = .23. When participants read the low diagnosticity message, 
low changeability marginally promoted defensiveness (preferences for strengths over weaknesses) relative to high 
changeability, F(1, 109) = 2.53, p = 0.11, d = .30.  However, this effect did not occur when participants read the 
high diagnosticity message, F(1, 122) = 0.77, p = 0.38, d = .16. We have no theoretical reason to predict this effect, 
and the lack of a self-affirmation effect suggests that this result may not be meaningful. All other effects were not 
significant, ps > .10. 
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adequately help them improve. In turn, this perceived lack of credibility might have reduced the 
self-protection motive because the information was less threatening. In the future, we may focus 
on a domain in which we can provide actual, real-world information of varying diagnosticity to 
participants. For example, providing individuals with information about risk for a disease from a 
medical doctor may appear credible enough to actually make participants feel threatened. 
 If participants did not feel adequately threatened in the current study, it may have been 
difficult to see an effect of self-affirmation. Participants may not have felt threatened because 
they only had the option to seek out negative information and did not actually receive negative 
feedback. That is, it is possible that the opportunity to seek negative information may not have 
been as strong of a threat as actually receiving and having to cope with negative feedback. In the 
future, we could test our hypothesis by providing participants with negative feedback and then 
assessing whether they would seek out additional weakness information, following the design of 
studies by Belding and colleagues (In Press). This paradigm may allow for a more thorough test 
of the dual-motive framework, because individuals’ motives should conflict more when they can 
no longer avoid the information. 
 In addition to factors that may have affected participants’ self-protection motives, some 
aspects of the study may have reduced participants’ perception that they could pursue their self-
change motive. Specifically, because we did not provide any information as to how participants 
could improve their emotional intelligence, participants may have felt that learning about their 
weaknesses would not help them to actually improve. The changeability manipulation may have 
conveyed that change was possible without also conveying a sense of self-efficacy that 
participants could engage in that change themselves.  
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Although we were unable to show support for our hypotheses in the current study, this 
work may prompt a variety of future directions. For example, the mechanism by which self-
affirmation promotes high-level construal remains an open question. One possibility is that self-
affirmation promotes high-level construal by prompting self-transcendence. When self-
affirmation induces feelings of love and connectedness (Crocker, Niiya, Mischkowski, 2008), it 
may induce social distance by prompting people to think about others. This increased social 
distance may then promote abstraction, which may ultimately ameliorate the threat of negative 
feedback. Future research may examine the connection between construal level and self-
transcendence in order to understand the relationship between self-affirmation and reduced 
defensiveness. 
Conclusion 
 The current study aimed to apply a dual-motive framework to self-affirmation. In the 
past, most self-affirmation research has focused on documenting its ability to reduce 
defensiveness. By framing self-affirmation’s effect in terms of shifting the weight of individuals’ 
self-protection and self-change motives, we may learn more as to why self-affirmation is 
effective. Furthermore, identifying boundary conditions of self-affirmation’s effectiveness is 
important for more accurate predictions of when it will reduce defensiveness. For example, if 
self-affirmation is indeed affected by changeability, emphasizing the changeability of the 
feedback domain may enhance one’s effort to pursue self-change goals. Emphasizing 
changeability may be especially important in the health domain, because many health dilemmas 
contain both changeable and unchangeable information. Despite this study’s null finding, 
continuing to explore the process of self-affirmation will lead to better applications in many 
different contexts. 
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Appendix A: Emotional Intelligence Inventory 
Barchard Emotional Intelligence Inventory 
 
In today’s experiment, you will complete an inventory that measures your skills within each 
domain of emotional intelligence. There are 4 domains that comprise one’s emotional 
intelligence: Interpersonal Communication Skills, Interpretative Abilities, Empathetic Aptitude, 
and Social Efficiency. Each of these domains assesses a separate aspect of emotional 
intelligence. Typically, the average Ohio State undergraduate performs fairly well, however, 
each individual usually performs well in some domains while performing not as well in other 
domains. Once you have completed the inventory, the computer will analyze the results. 
 
Please indicate where on the scale you fall for each statement. 
(1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
I am the life of the party. 
I don't mind being the center of attention. 
I feel comfortable around people. 
I start conversations. 
I don't talk a lot.  
I think a lot before I speak or act.  
I don't like to draw attention to myself.  
I am quiet around strangers.  
I am interested in people. 
I sympathize with others' feelings. 
I take time out for others. 
I feel others' emotions. 
I make people feel at ease. 
I am not really interested in others.  
I insult people.  
I am not interested in other people's problems.  
I feel little concern for others.  
I am easily disturbed. 
I change my mood a lot. 
I express my affection physically. 
I laugh out loud if something is funny. 
I express my happiness in a childlike manner. 
I sometimes laugh out loud when reading or watching TV. 
I hug my close friends. 
I show my feelings when I'm happy. 
I shout or scream when I'm angry. 
I can't help but look upset when something bad happens. 
I show my fear. 
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I suspect that my facial expressions give me away when I feel sad. 
I show my sadness.  
I keep my feelings to myself, regardless of how unhappy I am. 
I find it difficult showing people that I'm angry with them. 
I keep my feelings to myself, regardless of how scared I am. 
I rarely show my anger. 
I wish I could more easily show my negative feelings. 
 
Please indicate which answer you believe is correct. 
 
John and Sue were walking down the street holding hands.  As they passed by an ice cream shop, 
John wanted to go inside and get something to eat.  Sue began to get angry at John.  They 
ultimately argued about John's desire to go into the ice cream shop but Sue's desire not to.  Why 
do you think Sue didn't want to go into the ice cream shop? 
A.  She didn't want to be forced with a temptation that would derail her dieting goal and she 
found John inconsiderate because he didn't remember that. 
B.  Sue is lactose intolerant and can't eat anything at an ice cream shop. 
C.  Sue was in a rush to get to another appointment and was frustrated that John did not 
understand that she didn't have enough time for ice cream. 
 
Mike and Tom are playing basketball. Mike believes that Tom fouled him on the most recent 
play, however Tom does not believe that he fouled Mike. On the next play, Tom clearly shoves 
Mike. Why do you think Tom shoved Mike? 
A. Tom was upset that Mike thought he was fouled on the previous play 
B. Tom shoved Mike on accident 
C. Tom felt that Mike was going to score and shoved him to prevent a basket 
 
Jerry asks his friend Erin out on a date for the first time. In response, Erin laughed and walked 
away. Why do you think she reacted the way she did? 
A. She took Jerry’s request as a joke 
B. She felt too overwhelmed to properly respond 
C. She was embarrassed because she liked Jerry 
  
Kyle forgets to make coffee for his roommate, Jack, in the morning, despite promising that he 
would the night before. When Jack wakes up he makes coffee for the both of them. Why do you 
think Jack made coffee for Kyle as well? 
A. He is a good friend 
B. He figured that Kyle must have forgotten to make coffee for the both of them 
C. He decided that it wouldn’t be much extra work to make coffee for Kyle as well 
 
Andrew walks into class a few minutes late to class to discover that all the chairs in the 
classroom are full. How do you think Andrew will solve this problem? 
A. Decide to leave class and just go home 
B. Walk to the hallway and try to find a new chair 
C. Ask a fellow student to move their backpack so he can sit in a chair 
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Sam’s husband, Matt, comes home several hours after he finished work, even though he was 
supposed to come home right after so that they could have dinner together. He explains that he 
was late because he had a flat tire, and Sam decides to forgive Matt. Why do you think Sam 
forgave Matt? 
A. She trusts Matt 
B. She understands that sometimes outside factors can get in the way of plans 
C. She didn’t think it was a big deal that Matt missed dinner 
 
Jim is homeless, and begs for money to get food. As Nick is walking to his job at the nearby 
homeless shelter, Jim asks him for money. Nick decides to give him $20. Why do you think Nick 
gave Jim money? 
A. Nick enjoys helping people in need 
B. Nick has extra money and decided that Nick seemed like a nice man 
C. Nick believes that Jim will use the money to pay for food 
 
Janet stays in relationship with Collin even though he sometimes annoys her. She knows that she 
would likely have a better relationship with Collin’s brother, Peter, but she is not completely 
sure. Why do you think Janet doesn’t leave Collin to pursue Peter? 
A. She is afraid of the risk of rejection, even if it is small 
B. She is worried that Peter may just seem like a better fit because she is not in a 
relationship with him 
C. She doesn’t want to hurt Collin’s feelings 
 
Maria walked into her living room to find her brothers, Spencer and Tony, laughing and having a 
good time. The two had previously disliked each other. Why do you think they suddenly got 
along? 
A. They found a common interest 
B. They decided that brothers need to have each others backs no matter what 
C. They forgot the reason why they were mad at each other 
 
Jenna was excited to go to a concert last night, but didn’t end up going. Why do you think she 
didn’t attend the show? 
A. She lost interest in the bands playing prior to the concert 
B. Her friends forgot to buy her a ticket and the show sold out 
C. She was mad at the friends that she planned on going to the concert with  
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Appendix B: Self-Affirmation Manipulation 
Affirmation Condition 
Ranking of Personal Characteristics and Values 
 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of 
which may be unimportant. Please circle the value that you find most important, and write a few 
paragraphs about why it is important to you. 
 
 
Artistic Skills 
Sense of humor 
Relations with friends and family 
Spontaneity/living life in the moment 
Musical ability/appreciation 
Physical attractiveness 
Athletics 
Creativity 
Business/managerial skills 
Academics/Social skills 
Romantic values 
 
 
Control Condition 
Below is a list of characteristics and values, some of which may be important to you, some of 
which may be unimportant. Please circle the value that you find least important, and write a few 
paragraphs about why you think it may be important to someone else. 
 
 
Artistic Skills 
Sense of humor 
Relations with friends and family 
Spontaneity/living life in the moment 
Musical ability/appreciation 
Physical attractiveness 
Athletics 
Creativity 
Business/managerial skills 
Academics/Social skills 
Romantic values 
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Appendix C: Changeability/Diagnosticity Manipulations 
Low Changeability/Low Diagnosticity 
Thank you for completing this measure, we would like to provide you information 
regarding your performance on the Barchard Emotional Intelligence Inventory. Before we give 
you your results, we’d like to tell you a little bit more about this inventory.  
  Emotional Intelligence plays a major role in many aspects of everyday life. Research in 
the area has consistently found that people are unable to change most features of their Emotional 
Intelligence. Much research has shown that despite learning and experience in dealing with 
others, people are largely unable to alter the patterns of interacting with others that they learned 
at a very early age: their abilities tend to be fixed over time. 
Therefore, when people try to improve their Emotional Intelligence, they are often unable 
to succeed. This is unfortunate because a deficiency in any of the domains has many negative 
effects in a person’s life. Those with low Emotional Intelligence have less fulfilling social 
relationships and less understanding of others’ emotions than those who have high Emotional 
Intelligence. 
While researchers know the value of studying Emotional Intelligence, it has been difficult 
to assess individuals’ emotional intelligence because many outside factors impacted previous 
measures. Consequently, these measures were often unreliable.   
 However, preliminary hypotheses have suggested that the Barchard Emotional 
Intelligence Inventory can provide an effective measure for each domain of Emotional 
Intelligence. For example, a 15-year-old local high school student, Turner and his friends 
at Columbus City High School have attempted to show that the Barchard Emotional 
Intelligence Inventory can provide an accurate measure of ability in each domain of an 
individual’s emotional intelligence. 
 
Low Changeability/High Diagnosticity 
Thank you for completing this measure, we would like to provide you information 
regarding your performance on the Barchard Emotional Intelligence Inventory. Before we give 
you your results, we’d like to tell you a little bit more about this inventory.  
  Emotional Intelligence plays a major role in many aspects of everyday life. Research in 
the area has consistently found that people are unable to change most features of their Emotional 
Intelligence. Much research has shown that despite learning and experience in dealing with 
others, people are largely unable to alter the patterns of interacting with others that they learned 
at a very early age: their abilities tend to be fixed over time. 
Therefore, when people try to improve their Emotional Intelligence, they are often unable 
to succeed. This is unfortunate because a deficiency in any of the domains has many negative 
effects in a person’s life. Those with low Emotional Intelligence have less fulfilling social 
relationships and less understanding of others’ emotions than those who have high Emotional 
Intelligence. 
While researchers know the value of studying Emotional Intelligence, it has been difficult 
to carry out research in the area because of a lack of a standard measure of Emotional 
Intelligence. However, distinguished research has demonstrated that the Barchard Emotional 
Intelligence Inventory can provide an effective measure for each domain of Emotional 
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Intelligence. For example, Dr. Turner, a tenured professor with 15 years of experience, and his 
colleagues at Stanford University have shown that the Barchard Emotional Intelligence 
Inventory can provide accurate information about an individual’s emotional intelligence. The 
paper they published received the 2008 Outstanding Recent Contribution in Social Psychology 
award for its contribution to the literature on Emotional Intelligence. 
 
High Changeability/Low Diagnosticity 
Thank you for completing this measure, we would like to provide you information 
regarding your performance on the Barchard Emotional Intelligence Inventory. Before we give 
you your results, we’d like to tell you a little bit more about this inventory.   
Emotional Intelligence plays a major role in many aspects of everyday life. Research in 
the area has consistently found that people can change most features of their Emotional 
Intelligence. Much research has shown that starting at a young age and continuing through time, 
people can change their pattern of dealing with a variety of emotional interactions through 
learning and experience. 
Therefore, if people try, they can improve in each domain of Emotional Intelligence. 
Improving in this area can have many positive effects in a person’s life, including allowing for 
more fulfilling social relationships and increased understanding of others’ emotions. 
While researchers know the value of studying Emotional Intelligence, it has been difficult 
to assess individuals’ emotional intelligence because many outside factors impacted previous 
measures. Consequently, these measures were often unreliable.   
 However, preliminary hypotheses have suggested that the Barchard Emotional 
Intelligence Inventory can provide an effective measure for each domain of Emotional 
Intelligence. For example, a 15-year-old local high school student, Turner and his friends 
at Columbus City High School have attempted to show that the Barchard Emotional 
Intelligence Inventory can provide an accurate measure of ability in each domain of an 
individual’s emotional intelligence. 
 
High Changeability/High Diagnosticity 
Thank you for completing this measure, we would like to provide you information 
regarding your performance on the Barchard Emotional Intelligence Inventory. Before we give 
you your results, we’d like to tell you a little bit more about this inventory.   
Emotional Intelligence plays a major role in many aspects of everyday life. Research in 
the area has consistently found that people can change most features of their Emotional 
Intelligence. Much research has shown that starting at a young age and continuing through time, 
people can change their pattern of dealing with a variety of emotional interactions through 
learning and experience. 
Therefore, if people try, they can improve in each domain of Emotional Intelligence. 
Improving in this area can have many positive effects in a person’s life, including allowing for 
more fulfilling social relationships and increased understanding of others’ emotions. 
While researchers know the value of studying Emotional Intelligence, it has been difficult 
to carry out research in the area because of a lack of a standard measure of Emotional 
Intelligence. However, distinguished research has demonstrated that the Barchard Emotional 
Intelligence Inventory can provide an effective measure for each domain of Emotional 
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Intelligence. For example, Dr. Turner, a tenured professor with 15 years of experience, and his 
colleagues at Stanford University have shown that the Barchard Emotional Intelligence 
Inventory can provide accurate information about an individual’s emotional intelligence. The 
paper they published received the 2008 Outstanding Recent Contribution in Social Psychology 
award for its contribution to the literature on Emotional Intelligence. 
 
 
Construal & Self-Affirmation 31 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Probability of choosing weaknesses or strengths as a function of self-affirmation, 
changeability, and diagnosticity.  
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